Abstract In this paper we investigate computable models of ℵ 1 -categorical theories and Ehrenfeucht theories. For instance, we give an example of an ℵ 1 -categorical but not ℵ 0 -categorical theory T such that all the countable models of T except its prime model have computable presentations. We also show that there exists an ℵ 1 -categorical but not ℵ 0 -categorical theory T such that all the countable models of T except the saturated model, have computable presentations.
Introduction
We begin by presenting some basic definitions from effective model theory. A computable structure is one with a computable domain and uniformly computable atomic relations. Without lost of generality, we can always suppose that the domain of every computable structure is the set of all natural numbers ω and that its language does not contain function symbols. If a structure A is isomorphic to a computable structure B, then A is computably presentable and B is a computable presentation of A. Let σ be an effective signature. Let σ 0 ⊂ σ 1 ⊂ σ 2 ⊂ · · · be an effective sequence of finite signatures such that σ = t σ t . It is clear that a structure A of signature σ is computable if and only if there exists an effective sequence A 0 ⊂ A 1 ⊂ A 2 ⊂ · · · of finite structures such that for each i the domain of A i is {0, . . . , t i }, the function i −→ t i is computable, A i is a structure of signature σ i , A i+1 is an expansion and extension of A i , and the structure A is the union i A i . The domain of A is denoted by A. For a structure A of signature σ we write P A to denote the interpretation of the predicate symbol P ∈ σ in A. When it does not cause confusion, we write P instead of P A . In this paper we only deal with finite or countable structures.
A basic question in computable model theory is whether a given first-order theory T has a computable model. A standard Henkin type construction shows that each decidable theory, that is, the theory whose set of theorems is computable, has a computable model. Moreover, the satisfaction predicate for this model is computable. Such computable models are called decidable. Constructing computable (decidable) presentations for specific models of T has been an intensive area of research in effective model theory (see Ershov [2] , Goncharov [4] , and Millar [9] ). For example, the computableness of homogeneous models, in particular of prime and saturated models has been well studied. In [2] and [9] it is proved that the saturated model of T has a decidable presentation if and only if there exists a procedure which uniformly computes the set of all types of T. Goncharov [4] and Harrington [8] gave criteria for prime models to have decidable presentations. It is also known that the decidability of the saturated model of T implies the existence of a decidable presentation of the prime model of T ( [2] , Morley [10] ). Thus, a general question arises as to how computable models of undecidable theories behave in comparison to computable models of decidable theories. In this paper we investigate computable models of complete theories with "few countable models" [10] . Examples of such theories are theories with countably many countable models such as ℵ 1 -categorical theories and theories with finitely many countable models (Ehrenfeucht theories).
In [1] , Baldwin and Lachlan developed the theory of ℵ 1 -categoricity in terms of strongly minimal sets. They settled affirmatively Vaught's conjecture for ℵ 1 -categorical complete theories by proving that each complete ℵ 1 -categorical theory has either exactly one or ℵ 0 many countable models up to isomorphisms. Their paper also shows that all the countable models of any ℵ 1 -categorical theory T can be listed in an ω + 1 chain.
chain(T):
of elementary embeddings with A 0 and A ω being the prime and saturated models of T, respectively [1] . The results of Baldwin and Lachlan lead one to investigate the effective content of ℵ 1 -categorical theories and their models. Based on the theory developed by Baldwin and Lachlan, Harrington and Khissamiev [6] proved that every countable model of each decidable ℵ 1 -categorical theory T has a decidable presentation.
This result of Harrington and Khissamiev motivated the study of computable models of ℵ 1 -categorical undecidable theories. In 1972, Goncharov [3] constructed an example of an ℵ 1 -categorical but not ℵ 0 -categorical theory T for which the only model with a computable presentation is the prime model, that is, the first element of chain(T). Later in 1980, Kudeiberganov [7] modified Goncharov's construction to provide an example of an ℵ 1 -categorical but not ℵ 0 -categorical theory T with exactly n computable models. These models are the first n elements of chain(T). These results lead to the following two questions which have remained open. Question 1.1 (Goncharov [5] ) If an ℵ 1 -categorical but not ℵ 0 -categorical theory T has a computable model, is the prime model of T computably presentable?
Question 1.2 If all models
The above result of Harrington and Khissamiev also inspired Nerode to ask whether the hypothesis of ℵ 1 -categoricity of T can be replaced by the hypothesis that T has only finitely many countable models, that is, whether every countable model of a decidable Ehrenfeucht theory has a decidable presentation. Morley noted that if the countable saturated model of such a theory is decidable, then the theory has at least three computable models [10] . Lachlan answered Nerode's question by giving an example of a decidable theory with exactly six models of which only the prime one has a computable presentation. Later, for each natural number n > 3, Peretyatkin constructed an example of decidable theory with exactly n models such that the prime model of the theory is computable and none of the other models of the theory has computable presentations [11] . In [7] Kudeiberganov constructed an example of a theory with exactly three models such that the theory has only one computable model and that model is prime. The saturated model of the theory cannot be decidable, since otherwise, all three models of the theory would have computable presentations. These results lead Morley to ask whether any countable model of a decidable Ehrenfeucht theory T with a decidable saturated model has a decidable presentation [10] . There is a natural analog of this question for computable models. The result of Harrington and Khissamiev shows that if T is decidable, then SRM(T)= ω {ω}. The results of Goncharov and Kudeiberganov show that the sets {1, . . . , n}, where n ∈ ω, are spectra of computable models of ℵ 1 -categorical theories. In this paper we show that the sets ω − {0} {ω} and ω are also spectra of computable models of ℵ 1 -categorical theories.
Main results
The results of this paper are based on the idea of coding 0 2 or 0 2 sets with certain recursion-theoretic properties into ℵ 1 -categorical theories. Our first result is the following theorem which answers Question 1.1.
Theorem 2.1 There exists an ℵ 1 -categorical but not ω-categorical theory T such that all the countable models of T except its prime model have computable presentations (and so SRM(T ) = ω − {0} {ω}).
Before proving this theorem we would like to give the basic idea of our proof. For an infinite subset S ⊂ ω we construct a structure A S of infinite signature
where each P i is a binary predicate symbol. We will show that the theory T S of the structure A S is ℵ 1 -categorical and A S is the prime model of T S . The countable models of T S will have the following property: every nonprime model A of T S has a computable presentation if and only if the set S is a 0 2 -set. The existence of a computable presentation of the prime model will imply that the set S has a certain recursion theoretic property. Our recursion theoretic lemma (Lemma 2.6) will show that there exists a 0 2 -set S which does not have this property.
The construction of cubes
Let n be a nonzero natural number. Let σ n = ( P 0 , . . . , P n−1 ) be a signature such that each P i is a binary predicate symbol. For each nonzero natural number n we define a finite structure of signature σ n , called an n-cube, as follows: a 1-cube C 1 is a structure ({a, b}, P 0 ) such that P 0 (x, y) holds in C 1 if and only if x = a and y = b or y = a and x = b.
where P n (x, y) holds if and only if f (x) = y or f −1 (x) = y. It follows that we can naturally define an ω-cube C ω = i∈ω C i as an increasing union of n-cubes formed in this way.
An ω-cube C ω is a structure of the infinite signature σ = ( P 0 , P 2 , . . .). From these definitions of cubes we make the following claim.
Claim 2.2 For each n ≤ ω any two n-cubes are isomorphic.
Each binary predicate P i in any cube A is a partial function and sets up a one to one mapping from dom( P i ) onto range( P i ). Therefore we can also write
Construction of
Thus the structure A S is the disjoint union of all cubes A n , n ∈ S, with the natural interpretations of predicate symbols of signature σ. Let T S be the theory of the structure A S .
Claim 2.3 If S is an infinite set, then the theory T S is
Proof: The model A S satisfies the following list of statements. It is easy to see that this list of statements can be written as an (infinite) set of statements in the first-order logic.
1. ∀x∃yP 0 (x, y) and for each n, P n is a partial one to one function.
2. For all n = m and for all x, P n (x) = P m (x). 3. For each n and for all x if P n (x) is defined, then P 0 (x), P 1 (x), . . . , P n−1 (x) are also defined. 4. For all n, m and for all x if P n (x) and P m ( P n (x)) are defined, then
For each n ∈ ω, n ∈ S if and only if there exists exactly one n-cube that is not contained in an n + 1-cube.
Let M be a model which satisfies all the above statements. Then for each n ∈ S, M must have an n-cube which is not contained in an n + 1-cube. Moreover, if an x ∈ M does not belong to any n-cube for n ∈ S, then x is in an ω-cube. Note that each ω-cube is countable. Using the previous claim it can be seen that any two models which satisfy the above list of axioms are isomorphic if and only if these two models have the same number of ω-cubes. Hence T S is an ℵ 1 -categorical but not ℵ 0 -categorical theory.
Claim 2.4 The set S is in 0 2 if and only if every nonprime model of T S possesses a computable presentation.
Proof: Each ω-cube has a computable presentation. Therefore it suffices to prove that S ∈ 0 2 if and only if the nonprime model M of T S with exactly one ω-cube has a computable presentation. If M is computable, then s ∈ S if and only if
2 . Now suppose that S ∈ 0 2 . There exists a computable function f such that for every n ∈ ω, n ∈ S if and only if W f (n) is finite. We construct an effective sequence 
By the construction, the structure M ω is computable. The construction of M ω guarantees that the structure M ω is isomorphic to the model M .
Now we need the following definition and recursion theoretic lemma. We will prove the lemma in the next section. Now we give an answer to Question 1.2. The idea of our proof is the following. We take a 0 2 but not 0 2 set S and code this set into a theory T S . The language of T S will contain infinitely many unary predicates P 0 , P 1 , . . . and infinitely many predicates of arity n for each n ∈ ω. We will prove that T S is an ℵ 1 -categorical but not ℵ 0 -categorical theory. Our construction of T S guarantees that all the countable models of T S , except the saturated model, have computable presentations. The existence of a computable presentation for the saturated model will imply that the set S is a 0 2 set. This will contradict with the choice of S.
Theorem 2.8 There exists an ℵ 1 -categorical but not ℵ 0 -categorical theory T such that all the countable models of T except the saturated model, have computable presentations.
Proof: We construct a structure of the infinite signature
where each P i is a unary predicate and each R k,s is a predicate of arity k.
Let S be a ( 0 2 \ 0 2 ) set. There exists a computable predicate H such that n ∈ S if and only if ∀ x ∃ y H(x, y, n) holds. Below we present a step by step construction of a computable structure denoted by A S and prove that the theory T S of this structure satisfies the requirements of the theorem.
Stage 0
Let A 0 = ({0}, P 0 ), where P 0 (0) holds.
Stage t+1
The domain A t+1 of A t+1 is{0, . . . , t + 1}. The signature of A t+1 is 
For each i ≤ t + 1 let P i (x) hold if and only if
It is clear that the model A S is computable.
Claim 2.9 The theory T S of the model
Proof: The model A S satisfies the following list of properties which can be written as an infinite set of statements in the language of the first-order logic.
1. For all x if P i+1 (x) holds, then P i (x) also holds. Moreover, ∀x P 0 (x) is true.
For each i ∈ ω there exists a unique x such that
For every s ∈ ω there exists a j ∈ ω such that ∀n ≤ s∃m < jH(n, m, s). Let j s be the minimal number which has this property. Then for all pairwise distinct x 1 , . . . , ({0, a 1 , . . . , a n }, P 0 ), letting P 0 (0), P 0 (a 1 ), . . . , P 0 (a n )
hold.
Stage t+1
The domain A t+1 of A t+1 is {0, . . . , t + 1, a 1 , . . . , a n }. The signature of the A t+1 is . . . , x s ) hold if and only if one of the followings holds: (y 1 , . . . , y k ) holds. The set S would then be a 0 2 -set. This contradicts with our assumption that S ∈ 0 2 \ 0 2 . These claims prove Theorem 2.8.
For each i ≤ t + 1 let P i (x) hold if and only if x
Thus the above theorems prove the following corollary about spectra of computable models (SRM) of ℵ 1 -categorical theories.
Corollary 2.12
1. There exists an ℵ 1 -categorical but not ω-categorical theory T such that SRM(T ) = ω − {0} {ω}.
There exists an
In the next theorem, which answers Question 1.3, we provide an example of a theory T S with exactly three countable models of which only the saturated model is computably presentable. To prove that T S has exactly three countable models, we use the known ideas which show that the theory of the model (Q, ≤, c 0 , c 1 , . . .) , where ≤ is the linear ordering of rationals, and the constants are such that c 0 > c 1 > c 2 > · · ·, has exactly three countable models [12] .
Theorem 2.13 There exists a theory T with exactly three countable models such that the only model of T which has a computable presentation is the saturated model.
Proof: Let Q be the set of all rational numbers. For each cardinal number m ∈ ω {ω} define a structure Q 0 (m) as follows. The domain of the structure is
where {c q,i |q ∈ Q, 1 ≤ i ≤ m} is a set of new elements. The signature of the model is 
The unary function f in the new structure is the union of the unary operations of the first and the second structures. If n 0 , n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n i , . . . , i < ω is a sequence of natural numbers, then as above we can define the structure
Let S be a set in 0 2 which is not the range of a limitwise monotonic function. There exists a computable function g such that, for all nh(n) = lim s g(n, s) exists and range(h) = S. Consider the model Q 0 (S) defined by
Define the theory T S to be the theory of the structue Q 0 (S).
Claim 2.14 The theory T S has exactly three countable models.
Proof: The first model of T S is Q 0 (S). This model is the prime model of the theory T S . The second model of T S is
These structures are indeed models of T S . To see this, note that Q 0 (S) is a submodel of Q (S), and Q (S) is a submodel of M . It can be checked that for any formula ∃xϕ (x, a 1 , . . . , a n ) and all a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ Q 0 (S)(a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ Q (S)) if the formula ∃xϕ (x, a 1 , . . . , a n that ϕ(b, a 1 , . . . , a n ) is true in Q 0 (S)-in Q (S). Therefore the embeddings are elementary.
We have to prove that any countable model of T S is isomorphic to one of the 
The element a i is the one such that the following properties hold: 
were computable, then Q 0 (S) would be a computably enumerable submodel of the model Q (S). Hence Q 0 (S) would have a computable presentation. This is again a contradiction.
Claim 2.16
The saturated model M of the theory T has a computable presentation.
Proof: We present a constuction of the saturated model M by stages. The construction will clearly show that the saturated model has a computable presentation.
Stage 0
Consider the structure Q 0 (g(0, 0))+Q(ω). Denote this model by A 0 .
Stage n+1
Suppose that A n has been defined and is isomorphic to
Let i ≤ n be the minimal number such that g(i, n) = g(i, n + 1).A n can be extended to a structure A n+1 isomorphic to
To see this, take the substructure
of A n ; extend this substructure to Q(ω); insert the new structure
between the structures
and the extended structure Q(ω). The structure obtained in this way is A n+1 .
Thus we have the sequence
It is easy to see that the model A ω is ismorphic to
Now it is clear that the above description can be effectivized.
These claims prove the theorem.
Finally we have to prove the promised recursion theoretic lemma. A (i.e., A s (m e ) = 1) . Now R e is satisfied (since m e remains in A) unless at some later stage t 0 we find an x such that ϕ e (x, t 0 ) = m e . If so, R e ensures that A(ϕ e (x, t)) = 0 for all t ≥ t 0 . Thus, either f e (x) ↑ or f e (x) ↓ and f e (x) ∈ A.
Keeping ϕ e (x, t) out of A for all t ≥ t 0 can conflict with a lower priority (i > e) requirement R i since it may be the case that m i = ϕ e (x, t ) for some t > t 0 . However, if f e (x) ↓, then this holds permanently for just one number, and if f e (x) ↑, then the restriction is transitory for each number. So each lower priority R i will be able to choose a stable witness at some stage.
Construction
At stage s we try to determine the values of parameters m e , x e , and n e = ϕ e (x e , s) for R e . Each parameter may remain undefined. Moreover, we define the approximation A s to A at stage s.
Stage 0
Let A 0 = ∅, and declare all parameters to be undefined.
Stage s
For each e = 0, . . . , s − 1 in turn go through substage e by performing the following actions.
Proof: Suppose that y ∈ ω [e] , and let s 0 be a stage at which m e has reached its limit.
Since y can only be enumerated into A if y = m e , after stage s 0 , A(y) can change at most once. This proves the claim.
Claim 3.3
Suppose f e (x) = lim t ϕ e (x, t) exists for each x. Then A = range( f e ).
Proof: Suppose that A = range( f e ). Let s 0 be the stage at which m e reaches its limit. Then at some stage s > s 0 we must reach the second instruction of the construction, otherwise A(m e ) = 1 but m e ∈ range( f e ). Suppose that ϕ e (x, s) = m e for the minimal s ≥ s 0 at which we reach the second instruction of the construction. It follows that for t ≥ s, n e = ϕ e (x, t) and A t (n e ) = 0. So A( f e (x)) = 0. This contradiction proves the claim and hence the lemma.
Remark 3.4
It is possible to make A d.r.e., that is, A = B − C for some r.e. sets B, C. To do so, we have to set aside an interval I e , roughly of size 2 e , for R e , I 0 < I 1 < · · ·. As a first choice for m e , we take the maximal element of I e , and then we proceed downward. The point is that, if R e is injured by R i , i < e, via n i = m e , then all further values of n i are above the next values of m e (unless R i injured itself later).
Obviously A can be neither r.e. nor co-r.e.
